There have been few more influential figures in the Anglophone study of political thought in recent years than Quentin Skinner. Among the many features that characterised his energetic initial writings-in the late 1960s and early 1970s-was his comfort in writing both as a historian of philosophy and as a philosopher of history. As well as offering path-breaking interpretations of the intellectual context of seventeenth century writers like Hobbes, Skinner also offered a distinct, often controversial, methodological programme rooted in claims about the nature of historical understanding. His unique strand of linguistic contextualism-which he suggested was indebted to Collingwood, Wittgenstein and Austin-has undeniably had a transformative effect on how intellectual historians conceive of their craft. In the early 1980s, he began to speak in another scholarly voice: that of political theorist, as he engaged in a project of 'excavating' and defending a neo-classical understanding of human liberty, which, he argued, was popular among early-modern republicans but then usurped by a modern liberal alternative.
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at the expense of any concern with the philosophy of history. His only contribution to philosophical debates about issues in historical understanding has been a collated edition of his earlier articles in revised form, entitled Regarding Method. In this article, I suggest that this book is more important than it might otherwise appear and that this is partly because of the revisions that Skinner makes to his original contentions. Rather than focus mainly on the philosophical problems with the revised version of his contextualism 3 , the three main themes I explore in this article are: first, the nature of recent developments in his thought; second, what might be termed the theoretical and political ambitions these developments reveal; and third, why these ambitions appear unsustainable. I begin by suggesting that Regarding Method reveals
Skinner as the only figure of his generation still determined to justify an exclusively linguistic contextualist method of historical understanding. I then go on to discuss the way in which his methodology is now recast along anti-foundationalist lines and how this plays out in his representation of the historian as 'archaeologist' interested in 'rhetorical redescription'. After this, I move on to assess Skinner's attempt to present contextualism as a distinct critical approach to political philosophy, which I suggest is less than convincing.
Skinner's Contextualism Recapitulated
Mark Bevir has offered a critical, historicized reading of 'Cambridge School' linguistic contextualism, which stresses the intellectual background that framed its emergence. Herein, he argues that the lack of recent methodological interventions from its best-known proponents is revelatory of its historical specificity and also points to its philosophical weaknesses. and explanation of their craft and therefore might actually be Skinner's legacy in the philosophy of history.
From Detective to Archaeologist: Skinner's Anti-Foundationalist Turn
The most striking recent development in Skinner's methodological writing has been the ostensibly anti-foundationalist turn it has taken. Though many of the details of the method he defends remain the same, the way in which it is presented and justified has actually shifted quite dramatically. Its presentation has moved from an interest in speech-act theory seemingly reliant on traditional objectivist assumptions about the nature of an interpretive method, to an explicitly anti-foundationalist concern with 'rhetorical redescription' and the social utility of the historical studies such a concern enables. This is evident from his vision of the historian as 'archaeologist' committed not to the discovery of historical facts but rather to the 'excavation' of alien concepts justified with reference to the political use of such an excavation.
The classic expression of the deductive method employed by Sherlock Holmes is his oft-quoted declaration that 'when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth'. 14 Holmes' dictum can be plausibly understood in two different ways. On the one hand, it can be understood as something akin to 'Ockham's Razor', a mere motto, one that advises people to keep to the most basic evidential elements when constructing a hypothesis and avoid constructing elaborate theories when they are not required. But on the other, the dictum can be interpreted as something approaching an exclusivist methodological claim. It seems that in his early work Skinner conceives of the role of the historian as something akin 14 Despite this declaration (in The Sign of Four) Holmes' deductive and inductive techniques evinced over the course of his cases are actually more various and more complex than this dictum suggests. notes, his proposed rejection of traditional empiricism facilitates a particular vision of the historian: that of an 'archaeologist' whose objective is to excavate ideas from the past, 'bringing buried intellectual treasure back to the surface', the 'alien character' of which can expose us to different ways of thinking.
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In his recent book, Liberty Before Liberalism, Skinner suggests that his vision of the historian as archaeologist is an allusion to the work of Michel Foucault, a figure that is absent from his early work but now looms large as an intellectual influence.
Although James Tully has often written of parallels in the work of Skinner and Foucault, there actually appears to have been little in common between the two.
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What most obviously differentiates them is that the former has always appeared to privilege the author as a locus of analysis whereas the latter often appears to reduce authorial voice to constitutive discursive practices or regimes. 33 Nevertheless, in his recent work Skinner has embraced this alleged theoretical link. Linked to this embrace of Foucault is an embrace of Nietzsche, another thinker absent from Skinner's earlier work but now invoked as an important influence on his thought.
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The Nietzschean/Foucauldian influence appears most substantively in Skinner's account of the 'ideological' underpinnings of moral and political argument.
He claims that past political texts should be regarded as having been composed by 'innovating ideologists'. 35 These 'innovating ideologists' are individuals who attempt to rhetorically manipulate key terms through 'sleights of hand' in order to serve specific political strategies in the awareness that 'it is in large part by the rhetorical manipulation of these terms that any society succeeds in establishing, upholding, One of the effects of this turn towards Nietzsche and away from a seemingly foundationalist commitment to historical facts retrievable through a conventionalist method has been a corresponding reconfiguration of his use of speech-act theory, which has been refashioned to prioritise a concern with 'rhetorical redescription', the process through which innovating ideologists act to change the meanings of important political terms for their own ends. been doing in uttering (like declaring, promising etc) has been replaced with a much narrower interest in the purely ideological use of speech and the way evaluative language can be used to legitimate the activities of individuals and groups.
Conceptual History and Critique: Contextualism as Political Theory
Regardless of whether these recent developments in Skinner's thought-the explicit anti-foundationalist rejection of objectivity, the stress on the social value of historical enquiry and the interest in narrow strategic rhetoric rather than a wide repertoire of speech-acts-can be comfortably reconciled with his earlier arguments, they have allowed him to present his contextualism as something more than just an argument about the nature of history. These developments seem in fact to be part of an attempt to represent contextualism as something beyond a philosophy of history. This can be shown through an examination of how contextualism has been conceived (by Skinner and some of his followers) as a distinct, critical approach to political philosophy. Nevertheless, he does not actually explain at all how contextualism and conceptual history can be thought compatible at the methodological level. The fact that Koselleck was not a target of Skinner's early critical essays does not explain how an insistence on the particularistic understanding of meaning through individual speech-acts could ever cohere with an insistence on the tracing of the histories of individual concepts.
Skinner argues that the two approaches share a certain understanding of the social world, specifically how it can be transformed through the contestation of evaluative concepts. His contention is that both contextualism and conceptual history 'assume that we need to treat our normative concepts less as statements about the world than as tools and weapons of ideological debate'. 47 But this in itself is not enough to sustain any suggestion of compatibility. The issue of incompatibility does not concern how we treat our normative concepts but rather whether we regard concepts as the kind of autonomous entities that can be traced over time and how that claim (if accepted) could ever cohere with Skinner's speech-act theory.
Though Skinner does not demonstrate the compatibility of his contextualism with Koselleck's conceptual history, this task has been attempted by Kari Palonen. Tully, contextualism becomes not only a philosophy of history but also a political philosophy and one that not only provides the resources for but also actually embodies critique.
Both Palonen and Skinner claim that contextualism represents a specific critique of the tradition of normative political theory. In fact Skinner asserts that an endorsement of his contextualist 'vision of politics' entails that 'we place a question-mark against all those neo-Kantian projects of our time in which we encounter an aspiration to halt the flux of politics by trying definitively to fix the analysis of key moral terms. I continue to harbour a special prejudice against those who, in adopting this approach, imagine an ideal speech situation in which everyone (everyone?) would make the same moral and cognitive judgements '. 51 This criticism is clearly aimed at the normative concerns at the heart of the work of figures like John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas and their followers. The argument seems to be that a contextualist understanding of or approach to history facilitates a certain understanding of politics, which acts to undermine normative political theory as a project. Normative theory is rendered problematic by its apparent failure to take seriously the process of conceptual change. In engaging in abstract debates about the nature and demands of key political concepts such as justice or equality, normative political theorists illegitimately try to 'fix' the meaning of moral terms, thus ignoring the 'radical contingency' of our values and the necessarily ideological nature of our arguments.
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There are, however, several problems with this position, problems that undermine the ambitions that these scholars have for contextualism as a critical theory of politics that challenges other approaches, particularly that of the normative tradition. The first is that the criticism of the normative enterprise offered by these figures depends on a particular understanding of that enterprise and this understanding seems dubious. The contextualist criticism of normative political theory concerns two related issues: (1) the supposed failure to take seriously the 'radical contingency' of the evaluative concepts existing in any society and (2) the attempt to attain some kind of Archimedean point of universality and corresponding failure to realise that 'no one is above the battle, because the battle is all there is'. 53 Both these charges seem to rely on mischaracterisations of the nature of normative theory; both how it is practiced and how it can be practiced.
The first charge seems mistaken since it is the fact that our values are radically contingent and particular that creates the problem of political conflict that animates much normative theory in the first place. Another problem with the critical ambitions of the advocates of contextualism goes beyond (and is much more important than) the dubiety of their critique of normative theory. The second problem is that even if the normative project could be so characterised-as the misguided attempt at generating moral principles from pure abstraction without considering the possibility that our evaluative concepts are radically contingent-it remains the case that there is nothing in the theoretical arsenal of contextualism that would pose any real threat to it. This is because there is nothing inherently critical about contextualism as a philosophy of history in the first place. Skinner's main interpretive claim is that in order to be understood, the meaning of an utterance needs to be located within its particular linguistic context and that the Not only does contextualism not necessarily lead us to critique, it may actually yield quite different, conservative political conclusions. Skinner assumes that contextualism, because it involves an encounter with beliefs that will necessarily be alien to us, will facilitate a 'greater degree of understanding, and thereby a larger tolerance, for elements of cultural diversity' and a more 'self-critical' attitude. 58 But this requires something of a leap of faith. Why should we assume that intellectual encounters with alien belief systems from the past encourage people to be more tolerant rather than further entrench whatever prejudices they hold? The relationship between contextualism and the sorts of political claims Skinner wishes to make is at best a contingent one. To say that contextualism gives us the opportunity to avoid being 'bewitched' by the supposedly hegemonic values of a particular society and to recognise their contingency can be seriously considerable only as an empirical claim.
Any number of activities can enable us to recognise the contingency of our concepts and there seems no reason to privilege contextualist intellectual history in this regard over reading A Theory of Justice or hiking in the Canadian Rockies.
Conclusion
It seems almost certain that those familiar with the early methodological essays written by Skinner will have noted several changes in his recent writing. They might perhaps regard these changes as complementary to his recent work as a practising historian of ideas. But it is important to underscore that these are not merely changes in emphasis, style or presentation and not just a change in his interlocutors.
Furthermore, they are not any clear repudiation of the claims for which his contextualism became best known and not any concession to his many critics. Rather, his recent writing demonstrates substantial developments in the way in which his contextualism is delineated and justified. In many respects, these developments jar with his previous writing and whether a coherent philosophy of history is retrievable from Regarding Method remains uncertain. What is certain is that Skinner has embraced anti-foundationalism and in doing so has presented his method as less about the treatment as texts as speech-acts and more about strategic rhetorical moves, designed to alter to the social and political world in which an actor exists.
It remains unclear whether and how this anti-foundationalism has encouraged
Skinner to follow others and try to recast contextualism as a distinct critical approach to political philosophy. But regardless of the link between the two this recasting, as I suggested above, is unconvincing. Even if contextualism could be justified in terms of a method that outlines the necessary conditions of understanding, it cannot be successfully represented along the lines Skinner and others have suggested. Not only is contextualism incapable of being conceived as a fundamentally critical approach to politics, it is difficult to see how any philosophy of history could be understood in this way. Some extra work needs to be done to explain not only how it is possible to derive a critical approach to politics from a particularistic philosophy of history but also how it is possible to derive any theory of politics from philosophical assumptions about the nature of history. Past thinkers-most obviously Hegel and Marx-might have attempted such a derivation quite brazenly, but it is because their theorizing explicitly meshed assumptions about fact and value and did so in such a way that no contemporary philosophers could ever find convincing.
